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RESUMO: São muitas as definições do humanismo porque 
muitos são os pressupostos teológicos ou filosóficos em que se 
apoiam e muitas as posições político-ideológicas que procuram 
justificar. Louis Althusser sintetizou, meio século atrás, os 
pressupostos dessas doutrinas: há uma essência universal 
do homem; tal essência é atributo de indivíduos tomados 
isoladamente, que são seus sujeitos reais. A essência, que em si 
é um universal, se reproduz em cada homem; todos os homens 
seriam, portanto plenos detentores da humanidade, ou ainda, 
racionais. Assim compreendido, o humanismo, filosoficamente, 
é um discurso idealista que declara, a partir de uma nebulosa 
intuição de essência, que o homem ou “as pessoas” é ou são isso 
ou aquilo. Retoma, mesmo quando inspirado de elevados ideais 
de emancipação, uma das repostas mais comuns à pergunta pela 
essência do homem: a animalidade é sua matéria, mas sua forma 
substancial é a razão. Embora ela valha para todas as doutrinas 
metafísicas sobre a essência humana, Althusser tinha em vista, 
ao desenvolver sua crítica, as versões marxistas do humanismo, 
que se apoiam nas obras de juventude, inspiradas na noção de 
“essência genérica” (Gattungsweisen) do homem elaborada por 
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Feuerbach. Daí sua tese de que as descobertas teórico-científicas de 
Marx configuraram uma “ruptura epistemológica” com as ideias 
da juventude. Essa tese suscitou e continua suscitando múltiplas 
refutações: Althusser foi acusado de empirismo, positivismo, 
epistemologismo etc. As classificações pejorativas importam 
menos do que a doutrina “ontológica” do trabalho em que elas 
se baseiam. Tal como interpretado pelos ontólogos, o princípio 
de que o homem se autoproduziu pelo trabalho encerra-se num 
círculo vicioso: o trabalho produz o homem porque ele trabalha 
de um modo humano. A tautologia é ocultada por um postulado 
metafísico: o trabalho é a exteriorização da essência ativa do 
“ser humano genérico”. A autoprodução do homem não é, pois 
compreendida concretamente como resultado de um processo 
seletivo de hominização, mas como atualização de uma essência 
meta-histórica, segundo o modelo do par conceitual aristotélico 
potência/ato (trabalhando, o hominídeo já era homem em 
potência). A despeito do estágio elementar dos conhecimentos 
arqueológicos de seu tempo, ao examinar a categoria trabalho 
em O Capital, livro I cap. 5, Marx se referiu às “primeiras formas 
instintivas, animais, de trabalho”, ilustrando-as com a teia da 
aranha e a colmeia das abelhas. Assinalou ainda que nelas se 
delineiam formas embrionárias da técnica, notando porém que “o 
emprego e a criação dos meios de trabalho, embora se encontrem 
em germe em algumas espécies animais, caracterizam o processo 
de trabalho especificamente humano”. Evidentemente, não cabia 
numa crítica da economia política burguesa proceder ao estudo 
aprofundado das modalidades pré e extra humanas do trabalho. 
Mas as concisas considerações que ele consagra ao tema não 
deixam a menor dúvida: “pressupomos o trabalho numa forma 
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em que ele pertence exclusivamente ao homem”, isto é, esta forma 
constitui o ponto de partida do Capital, mas ela é o resultado 
de um longo processo de hominização e não a expressão meta-
histórica de uma essência genérica. À luz dessas considerações, 
a crítica ontológica da “ruptura epistemológica” recai, em 
irônica dialética, numa velha e radical ruptura metafísica: entre 
natureza e cultura, ou em linguagem explicitamente teológica, 
entre corpo e alma. Pode-se criticar o efeito provocador da 
expressão anti humanismo teórico. Exatamente porque é muito 
mais simpático aderir à ontologia trabalhista do ser social do 
que à crítica dos pressupostos meramente ideológicos e no mais 
das vezes retóricos do discurso humanista, Althusser teria sido 
mais bem compreendido se em vez de molestar a sensibilidade 
cultural dos intelectuais de esquerda, ele tivesse se cingido a 
criticar a pretensão de dizer o que o homem é, sem passar pela 
análise das condições concretas da evolução do homo sapiens. 
Submetido à crítica materialista, o ideal de uma humanidade 
liberada da opressão, da exploração de classes e da miséria 
da existência, meta irrenunciável das lutas revolucionárias 
inspiradas no marxismo vivo, deixa de ser ontologicamente 
garantida pela “essência genérica do ser social”. Mas abandonar 
uma garantia quimérica é avançar rumo à verdade efetiva das 
coisas. A longa história do homo sapiens não é a atualização de 
uma essência pré-fixada. Ela corre por um rio caudaloso cujo 
leito não foi traçado de antemão. A lógica objetiva que Marx 
discerniu na trama densa das relações sociais não obedece a 
nenhuma teleologia imanente. A instauração de uma forma 
superior de organização social, na qual os meios de produção de 
riquezas deverão se tornar patrimônio comum (=comunista) da 
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humanidade, é o mais elevado programa político de emancipação 
da humanidade, mas exatamente por ser um programa, depende 
da virtù e da fortuna dos que se batem para concretizá-lo.
KEYWORDS: Humanismo; Metafísica; Trabalho.
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There are many definitions of humanism because there are many 
theological or philosophical assumptions that support them and 
many political and ideological positions that they seek to justify. 
Louis Althusser synthesized, half a century ago, the fundamental 
assumptions of these doctrines: there is a universal essence of man; 
this perennial and unhistoric essence belongs to individuals taken 
separately, who are their actual subjects. Thus understood, the 
humanism, philosophically, is an idealistic conception declaring, 
from a nebulous intuition of essence, that man or “people” is this 
or that. Even when inspired by high ideals of emancipation, this 
idealistic conception takes for granted the question about the essence 
of man: animality is his matter, but his substantial form is reason. 
Although his criticism is valid for all the metaphysical 
doctrines about the human essence, Althusser had in mind, when 
developing it, Marxist versions of humanism, inspired in Marx’s 
early writings, when he was still under the strong influence 
of Feuerbach. Hence his thesis that the theoretical-scientific 
discoveries of Marx supposes an “epistemological rupture” with 
the ideas of the youth, particularly with the notion of “generic 
essence” (Gattungsweisen) of man. This thesis has aroused and 
continues raising multiple refutations: Althusser was accused of 
empiricism, positivism, epistemologism etc. Pejorative ratings 
matter less than the “ontological” doctrine of labour in which 
they are based. 
All marxists agree that man is self-produced by labour and 
consider it the key and the foundation of historical materialism. 
The problem is that many understand this process as the self-
development of a subject that externalizes his essence by labour, 
conceived as the generic human being’s active essence. Thus 
interpreted, the Marxist principle that man is self-produced by 
labour leads to a vicious circle: labour produces man because 
he labours in a human way. The tautology is concealed by 
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a metaphysical postulate: the self-production of man is not 
understood specifically as a result of natural selection (= the 
hominization), but as a meta-historical essence, according 
to the model of the Aristotelian conceptual pair potentia/
actus (labouring, the hominid was already man in potentia). 
The historical-materialist position, such as synthesized by 
Engels in his remarkable text about book “The role of labour in 
the transformation of monkey in man”, written in 1876, published 
“post mortem” in 1896 in Die Neue Zeit, and symptomatically 
forgotten by essentialist tendencies of Marxism, sustain, instead, 
that homo sapiens and their ability to modify the nature by its 
peculiar form of labour, results from the material process of 
hominization.
This was also the position of Marx. Despite the elementary 
stage of archaeological knowledge in his time, when he examines 
the concept of labour in The Capital (book I Chapter 5), he refers 
to the “first instinctive, animal, forms of labour”, illustrating 
them with the spider’s web and the bee’s hive. He points out that 
“the employment and the creation of means of labour, although 
in germ in some animal species, characterize the process of 
specifically human labour”. Other species delineate embryonic 
forms of technique, but it wouldn’t fit in a critique of bourgeois 
political economy an in-depth study of pre and proto modes of 
human labour. But the concise considerations that he devotes to 
the subject do not leave the slightest doubt: “we assume labour in a 
form that belongs exclusively to man”, i.e. this form constitutes the 
starting point of the Capital, but it is the result of a long process of 
hominization and not the expression of a meta- historical essence. 
These considerations suggest that the ontological criticism of the 
“epistemological break” falls, in ironic dialectic, in an old and 
radical break: between nature and culture, between body and soul. 
We can criticize the provocative effect of the phrase anti 
theoretical humanism. Precisely because the ontology of social 
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labour is much more sympathetic than the criticism of merely 
ideological and often rhetorical assumptions of humanist 
discourse, Althusser would have been better understood if 
instead of harassing the cultural sensitivity of the intellectuals of 
the left, he had just criticized the pretension of saying what man 
is, without undertaking the analysis of the concrete conditions 
of the evolution of homo sapiens. In any case, it’s difficult to 
understand how to be anti-humanist in theory and humanist in 
practice. 
Subjected to materialist critique, the ideal of a humankind 
freed from oppression, exploitation and misery of existence, 
irrevocable goal of revolutionary struggles inspired by Marxism, 
ceases to be ontologically guaranteed by “generic social being’s 
essence”. But abandoning a guarantee fantastic view of things 
is to advance towards the effective truth of things. The long 
history of homo sapiens runs by a raging river, whose course 
was not mapped out beforehand. The objective logic that 
Marx discerned in the dense social relations plot doesn’t obey 
any immanent teleology. The establishment of a higher form 
of social organization, in which the means of production of 
wealth should become common heritage (=Communists) of 
mankind, is the highest political program of emancipation 
of humanity, but exactly for being a program, it depends on 
the virtù and fortune of those who are fighting to achieve it.
LOSURDO’S CRITICISM
In a recent study entitled “How is born and how dies the 
western Marxism”2, Domenico Losurdo dedicates a topic to a 
replica of Althusser’s criticism of humanist doctrines. Many 
have already challenged him by relegating the universal ideas 
to the sphere of pure ideology, dissociating them from theory. 
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But what he actually criticizes is the dogmatic claim that we 
can say what the human being is without passing through the 
analysis of the relations of production which articulate society. 
As we said previously, although this criticism is valid for all the 
metaphysical doctrines about man’s essence, he had in view, 
in developing it, the Marxist versions of humanism, based in 
the labours of the Young Marx, inspired by the humanism of 
Feuerbach. We argued that this doctrine is a metaphysical 
interpretation of labour, which considers it the exteriorization 
of the generic essence (Gattungsweisen) of homo faber/sapiens 
and resolves the historical movement in the idealist dialectic of 
alienation and its overcommig. 
The central focus of the Losurdo’s argument is the 
reaffirmation of Marxist humanism. His criticism of Althusser 
consists essentially in enumerating examples of positive use 
in Marx’s labours, of the concepts of human, humanism and 
derivatives. The young Marx saw in the existent society the 
denial of positive humanism (positiver Humanismus), complete 
humanism (vollendeter Humanismus), (MEW, Erg. Bd., I 583 
and 536), real humanism (realer Humanismus) (MEW, II, 7). 
His revolutionary program outlined the “categorical imperative 
to overthrow all relations in which man is a being degraded, 
enslaved, abandoned, despised” (p. 399, MEW, I, 385).3 The 
humanist vocabulary remains not only in the Manifest of the 
Communist Party, “labour of theoretical maturation”. We read 
also in Capital , the labour of maturity fully attained, that the 
greedy profit entails “waste” of human life; that at the beginning 
of the industrial system, the great abduction of children in the 
homes of the poor and the orphanages has incorporated a human 
material completely devoid of desire and that the bourgeois 
society celebrates the image of itself as “a real Eden of the innate 
rights of man” , when in reality, in its scope, the “human labour”, 
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moreover, “man as such (...) plays a miserable part”. Finally, 
far from being recognized in his dignity of man, the labourer 
“leads to market its own skin and doesn’t have another thing 
to expect but the tannery” (LOSURDO, 2011, p. 399-400). 
But what proves these citations of the positive use made 
by Marx of humanist vocabulary? Just that he has never 
established an abstract separation between the vocabulary of 
the theory and the vocabulary of the political struggle. They 
certainly do not prove that Marx considered the essence of 
man an universal principle of explanation of human history; 
on this issue, Losurdo remains silent. For him, what matters is 
the historical construction of the idea of universal humanity, 
the old struggle to eliminate the racist, colonialist and class 
differences among men. And Losurdo’s struggle for the defense 
and illustration of this historic construction earned him 
deserved recognition, making him one of the main references of 
theoretical Marxist anti-imperialism on an international scale. 
However, whether we like it or not, moral discourse is 
immersed in ideology; the moral abstractions are much too 
vague, when not outright contradictory. It is not needed a huge 
terminological rigor to realize that common phrases and morally 
sympathetic phrases, as for example, “torture is inhumane”, 
omit that, on the contrary, torture is a characteristically 
human institution. Primates, reptiles, insects etc. do not 
torture. About the word “human”, you can say the same as 
Marx said of “population” in the famous Introduction of 1857: 
“It seems correct to begin by real and by concrete, by 
the actually real assumption and, thus, in Economy, for 
example, by population, the foundation and the subject of 
the whole act of social production (die Grundlage und der 
Subjekt des ganzen gesellschaftlichen Produktionsakts). A 
more accurate account, however, shows that this is false. 
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The population, for example, if I omit the classes that 
constitute it, is mere abstraction”. 
Just replace population by man (or human, humanity etc.) 
to note that the theoretical problem raised by Althusser is the 
same: the humanity, if I omit the classes that constitute it, is 
mere abstraction. He does not criticize the humanist values in 
general, but the metaphysical postulate of a universal essence 
of man, which would be an attribute of each individual taken 
separately.4 Thus understood, humanism is an idealistic doctrine 
that declares, from a vague intuition of essence, that man or 
“people” is or are this or that. Resumes, sometimes inspired by 
high ideals of emancipation, one of the most common answers 
to the question of men’s essence: animality is its matter, but its 
substantial form is reason, or, in explicitly theological record, 
man is body and soul. 
From the epistemological break to the materialism of the 
encounter, the Althusser’s concern in examining critically the 
simplifications and the metaphysical answers to problems raised 
by the theory of Marx remained constant. At the very least, he 
has awakened from the dogmatic sleep the purely ideological 
marxists, many of them flirting openly with idealism. But his 
criticism would have been more welcomed and understood if 
instead of go in against hand of the cultural sensitivity of the 
left, he had just criticized the assumptions purely ideological 
and most of the times rhetorical oh humanistic doctrines. 
The fundamental link between the processes of the natural 
history and the social history of homo sapiens was expressed 
in a lapidary phrase of Engels during Marx’s funeral, in honor 
of the “greatest of thinkers”, who had “ceased to think” three 
days before, in march 14, 1883: “just as Darwin discovered 
the law of development of organic nature, Marx discovered 
the law of development of human history”. This analogy 
REVISTA IDEAÇÃO, N. 30, JUL./DEZ. 2014
57
between the respective contributions of the two geniuses 
of knowledge earned Engels a lasting antipathy from those 
that consider marxism a metaphysics of human labour. 
In this decisive point, Losurdo’s theoretical humanism led 
him to a huge disregard of the theoretical importance of Capital, 
the work to which Marx devoted his greatest intellectual effort: 
The continuity in the evolution of Marx is obvious, and 
what Althusser describes as epistemological rupture 
is nothing more than the passage to a discourse in 
which the moral condemnation of anti-humanism 
of bourgeois society is expressed in a manner more 
concise and more elliptical (LOSURDO, 2011, p. 401).
Reduce the colossal contribution of Marx to the knowledge of 
the social evolution of humanity to mere “more concise and 
more elliptical” way of expressing his ideas is inflict him an 
unacceptable “capitis deminutio”. The unilateral emphasis on 
moral aspect conflicts with the famous statement of Marx at 
the end of the Preface to the Critique of political economy : 
( ... ) my views — no matter how they may be judged and 
how little they conform to the interested prejudices of the 
ruling classes — are the outcome of conscientious research 
carried on over many years. At the entrance to science, 
as at the entrance to hell, the demand must be made: 
“Qui si convien lasciare ogni sospetto; 
Ogni viltà convien che qui sia morta”
WESTERN MARXISM AND ANTI-COLONIALISM
As we recognize the impropriety of the expression theoretical 
anti humanism, we don’t refer only to its political effects on the 
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cultural sensitivity of the left. The most consistent criticism that 
Losurdo directs to Althusser is that, without assuming firmly 
and positively the value of the idea of humanity, it would not 
make sense to speak about dehumanization. When we hear a 
spokesman of the American oppression machine talk about 
“human rights”, we reject this gross hypocrisy on behalf of 
human emancipation, which presupposes the abolition of class 
exploitation, of force as “ultima ratio” of international relations 
and full equality of peoples. It’s not because imperialism corrupts 
and prostitutes the universalist values that we should reject 
them. But precisely, to unmask the imperialist mystification, it’s 
not enough to reiterate that Socialists and Marxists defend the 
real humanism, if only because you don’t have to be a Marxist 
to denounce the miseries, injustices and atrocities of the world.
It is however in the grounds of historical materialism that we 
can criticize radically the imposture of bourgeois universalism 
and show that this alleged bourgeois humanism is based on 
exploitation of labor, the use of military force and in predatory 
plundering of natural resources. And it is also on these grounds 
that we can discern the contradictions that determines the course 
of world history and the principal enemies of the emancipation 
of the human species. In July 26, 1920, Lenin contended at the 
Second Congress of the Comintern that “the characteristic trait 
of imperialism is that the whole world [...] is divided currently 
in a large number of oppressed peoples and a little number of 
oppressors which have colossal wealth and a powerful military 
force”. Ninety-three years later, this observation remains valid. 
Shall we include Althusser in the of western Marxist’s 
school? Maintaining objectivity in his criticism, Losurdo 
recognizes that “Althusser follows with deep participation 
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the struggles undertaken by colonial peoples and looks with 
sympathy to China, who yearns for the leadership of the anti-
imperialist movement; however, from a theoretical point of 
view, he does not seem able to grasp the full meaning of these 
struggles”. Why? According to Losurdo it is “a phenomenon of 
general nature”. “During the years of 1960 and 1970, a massive 
misunderstanding characterizes the Marxist left in Europe and in 
the United States: the large demonstrations in favor of Vietnam 
are interwoven quietly with the tribute to authors that considered 
definitively overcome the national liberation movements”. 
But to illustrate this generalized misconception it is not 
Althusser but Adorno the one criticized. Losurdo blames the 
Negative Dialectic, of 1966, for having liquidated the Hegelian 
thesis of the “spirit of the people” (Volksgeist) and denied 
the essential character of the national dimension and of the 
national question”, estimating it “reactionary and regressive”, 
“in relation to the Kantian universal of this period”, and 
condemning his “nationalism” and “provincialism” in an epoch 
of global conflicts, when “an organization of the world” becomes 
possible. Worse still, the Volksgeist would mean the devotion 
to a “fetish”, a “collective subject” (the nation), within which 
“the individual subjects disappear without leaving traces”. This 
position taken by Adorno unlegitimizes a posteriori the war 
waged by National Liberation Front in Algeria, a people and a 
country without doubt more parochial, more backward and less 
cosmopolitan than France, against whom the Algerian people 
rose up. In any case, Adorno was placed in the impossibility 
of understanding the great struggles that were occurring 
under his eyes, beginning with the one guided by National 
Liberation Front in Vietnam”. (p. 403; italics in original)
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BRIEF CONCLUSION
Although he does not discuss in what sense he considers 
correct or incorrect to say that the humanism assumes a universal 
essence of man, nor what would be this essence (a categorical 
imperative, a pure idea of reason, a revolutionary ideal), Losurdo 
is right in arguing that the recognition of the full equality of 
men constitutes an irrevocable goal of revolutionary struggles 
of our time and that therefore, against the false universality 
of liberal ideology, we must defend unreservedly the cause of 
humanity. We must also recognize the relevance of his criticism 
of Western authors, marxists, half-marxists and anti-marxists, 
about the Nations that have freed themselves from colonial 
rule. Include in the same condemnation the imperialist States 
and those originated from national liberation movements 
implies hiding the historical consequences of colonization and 
disregarding the persistent contradiction between the oppressed 
peoples and the peoples oppressors, pointed out by Lenin for 
almost a century now. In accordance with this rhetorical anti-
statism, humanity would continue to be divided between 
oppressors from the center and the oppressed of the periphery.
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